That was the big story over the last week.
According to Wikipedia:
“On June 22, 2025, the United States Air Force and Navy attacked three nuclear facilities in Iran as part of the Iran–Israel war. The Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center were targeted with fourteen GBU-57A/B 30,000-pound "bunker buster" bombs carried by B-2 stealth bombers, and with a separate barrage of Tomahawk missiles fired from a submarine. The attack, which was given the codename Operation Midnight Hammer, was the United States' first offensive action in the Iran–Israel war, which began on June 13 with surprise Israeli strikes.”
Now, you may or may not agree about the advisability of the action taken against Iran. I, for one, agree that it was the right thing to do.
As I’m writing this the Iran-Israel conflict (war?) has gone from Israel and Iran exchanging missile barrages, to the U.S. dropping 30,000-pound bunker buster bombs and Tomahawk missiles, to a brokered ceasefire, to the ceasefire being broken, to the ceasefire resuming. It’s dizzying.
Iran provided advance warning to Qatar before launching its retaliatory missile strikes against the U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. It’s believed that the warning was intended to make the attack symbolic and not deadly. As a result, this attack saw 13 of 14 missiles destroyed before they could do any harm. The 14th was deemed non-threatening and caused no damage.
It’s also noteworthy to point out that Iran’s response was condemned by a dozen middle eastern countries, including the Palestinian Authority. That says a lot.
But I wonder, why knock out Iran’s nuclear facilities now?
After all, we’ve known about Iran’s nuclear ambitions for some time. Over the last 30+ years Iran has always been close to having nukes. The time estimates of them being capable of building a nuclear bomb have ranged from 7 years to 1-2 weeks. A list of these estimates is included at the end of the article.
The tipping point now seemed to be that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on May 31, 2025 that Iran had increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% purity, just below weapons-grade, to over 408 kilograms, enough for multiple nuclear weapons if further enriched. This escalation, coupled with Iran's non-compliance with a 2019 agreement, heightened concerns about its nuclear ambitions.
Regardless of the rationale for military intervention, I’m happy that the guys who chant “death to America” won’t be able to nuke us. I pray that the Middle East simmers down for a change.
What do you think?
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Epilog
As I go to press it’s been five days since the U.S. bombed Iran. The ceasefire seems to be holding. It’s instructive to look at how each country has moved on.
Israel
Nearly all wartime restrictions have been lifted and normalcy is being restored.
The Ben Gurion International and Haifa airports have reopened.
El Al, the Israeli airline, added flights to allow citizens stranded abroad to return home.
The Israeli government has made public messages of success.
Iran
The Iranian government opened its airspace on June 24.
Internet access has been limited to curb dissent.
The Iranian government cracked down on anti-war protests with trials and executions of protesters being expedited.
State television broadcast scenes of jubilant crowds celebrating a “national victory,” aiming to rally public support and counter perceptions of weakness after significant damage to nuclear and military infrastructure.
The Iranian parliament voted to fast-track a proposal to halt cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reflecting a hardline shift. This move, coupled with claims of victory, aims to reassure citizens of Iran’s sovereignty and strength.
Two countries, two different forms of government and two different responses to the same event.
Iran Nuclear Ambitions – A Timeline
1992: Israeli MP Benjamin Netanyahu warns the Knesset that Iran is 3–5 years from developing a nuclear bomb (by 1995–1997).
1993: Reports indicate Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons and is 3–5 years from capability (by 1996–1998).
1995: Israeli and U.S. officials, cited by The New York Times, warn Iran is less than 5 years from nuclear weapons capability (by 1998–2000). Netanyahu reiterates in his book Fighting Terrorism that Iran is close to nuclear capability.
1995: U.S. Senator Alan Cranston claims Iran is 7 years away from a nuclear weapon.
1996: Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres claims Iran’s nuclear weapon “deadline is extremely close,” within 1 year (1996–1997). Netanyahu, addressing the U.S. Congress, warns of catastrophic consequences if Iran develops nuclear weapons.
2002: Reports claim there is “no question” Iran is developing nuclear weapons, following the exposure of undeclared enrichment sites at Natanz and Arak.
2003: Warnings suggest Iran’s nuclear program poses a global threat, with some estimates indicating a bomb could be developed by 2006–2008.
2003: U.S. National Intelligence Estimate concludes Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, though it keeps the option open.
2006: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announces uranium enrichment to reactor-grade, prompting warnings of a potential crash nuclear program within a few years.
2007: IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei warns against calls to bomb Iran, indicating concerns about Iran’s nuclear intentions.
2009: Israeli officials claim Iran is 1–2 years away from a nuclear weapon.
2011: IAEA report outlines concerns about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, noting activities relevant to nuclear weapons development until 2003.
2012: Netanyahu, addressing the UN General Assembly, warns Iran is close to a nuclear bomb, illustrating his concerns with a diagram.
2018: Netanyahu presents alleged evidence of Iran’s secret nuclear weapons program (1999–2003), claiming Iran hid activities from the international community. IAEA reiterates no credible evidence of nuclear weapons activity after 2009.
2021: Former U.S. officials, including ex-CIA director James Woolsey, claim Iran “probably has already the atomic bomb,” citing past intelligence failures
2023: IAEA reports Iran enriched uranium to 83.7% at Fordow, close to weapons-grade (90%), raising concerns about breakout time.
2024 (July): U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken estimates Iran is 1–2 weeks from producing enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear bomb, though weaponization would take longer (several months to 2 years).
2025 (March): U.S. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testifies that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and its supreme leader has not reauthorized the 2003-suspended program, though its enriched uranium stockpile is at unprecedented levels.
2025 (March): Iran Watch estimates Iran could enrich enough uranium for 5 bombs in 4–5 weeks, though weaponization would take several months.
2025 (May): IAEA reports Iran’s stockpile of 60% enriched uranium reached 408 kg, enough for multiple nuclear weapons if further enriched.
2025 (June): Israeli PM Netanyahu claims Iran could produce a nuclear weapon in “months, even weeks” if not stopped, following Israeli strikes on Natanz.
2025 (June): U.S. intelligence assesses Iran is not actively pursuing a nuclear weapon but could produce one in several months to a year if decided
2025 (June): General Michael Kurilla, U.S. Central Command, estimates Iran could produce weapons-grade uranium for 10 bombs in 3 weeks if it sprints toward a weapon.
2025 (June): White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt claims Iran could produce a weapon in as little as 2 weeks, aligning with Israeli estimates.
2025 (June): Tulsi Gabbard revises her stance, stating Iran could produce a nuclear weapon “within weeks to months,” aligning with Trump’s view after he dismissed her earlier assessment.
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